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DUAL EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS: ABSTRACT
This thesis is in two chapters* The first surveys the 
existing literature on 'dual exchange rate systems' — where 
current and capital transactions are channeled through seperate 
foreign exchange markets* The early, comparative static, 
models concentrate on whether the instruments of demand 
Management will work, and conclude that under dual regimes, 
ike with fixed or floating unified rates, hoth fiscal 
^ and monetary policy can he effective* Later, dynamic, models 
focus on the impact of exogenous capital flows (usually 
represented hy external interest rate movements) on economies 
with dual systems* The process of expectations formation proves 
crucial - so rational expectations appear naturally in a crop 
P&p6i"s whose shared conclusion is that a dual system entirely 
insulates the domestic economy from the effects of such flows. 
Finally, there have been studies of dual systems in practice# 
chief conclusion is that the benefits have been more 
 ^ questionable than theory would suggest.
The rationa_c expectations model of a dual exchange market 
described in Chapter II goes beyond previous models in a number 
of ways. It permits precise comparison of the insulation 
properties of dual rates with those of other regimes* It 
allows for Government intervention between the two exchange 
markets under a dual regime* And it analyses the case where 
only imperfect information is available on the movements of 
external variables. The chief results are that for an open
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economy producing a differentiated product a dual system is 
likely to be more effective than either fixed or floating 
rates in insulating domestic activity from external interest 
rate movements (although perfect insulation is not achieved), 
and no less effective in insulating it from external price 
changes. This remains true when only imperfect information 
is available and also (although diminishingly so) when the 
Government intervenes between the exchange markets for capital 
and current transactions.
)
)CmiPTER ONE; A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
I Introduction
At about the time of the 197*^  changes in the Foreign Exchange 
Markets there was a burst of internationsuL enthusiasm for foreign 
exchange régimes in which current and capital transactions are 
channeled through separate markets, often at different exchange 
rates. At the end of 1970 only 9 countries maintained such 
systems. By the start of 1973 26 countries (out of 127 surveyed 
by the IMF) maintained some form of dual market. This group
i
included France and the French Operations Account Countries,
Italy, the Belgium/Luxembourg Economic Union, the Netherlands 
and South Africa. Interest waned however almost as rapidly as 
it had arisen. In the cmirRe of 1974 France (and the Operations 
Account Countries), Italy and the Netherlands all abolished their 
dual markets. Others have lasted longer. South Africa's 
'financial rand' only finally disappeared in 1983, and the 
Belgium/Luxembourg economic union continues to maintain a dual 
market (there are also dual markets of a rather different kind 
still functioning in a number of third world countries, notably
and Argentina - we do not consider these here).
Academic economists battened early onto the phenomenon 
of dual markets. Fleming (1971) was probably the first to look 
at the arrangements which would be required for a viable dual 
market system, and their likely consequences. He was 
closely followed by Salin (1971) and Barattieri & Regazzi (1971) 
and reverted to the subject himself in 1974- «u-th his comparison
ol the effectiveness of dual markets with other forms of control 
on capital movements. There was then a number of, in general 
more mathematical studies looking at the effectiveness of the 
traditional tools of economic management under dual exchange rate 
régimes; including Argy & Porter (1972), Decaluwe (1974),
^woboda (1974), Eoll (I976), Dornbusch (1976), Decaluwe & Steinherr 
(1976) and Marion (198I). A number of these authors emphasise 
the key role played by the formation of exchange rate expectations 
in any analysis of dual markets, while introducing rather ad hoc 
hypotheses for this into their models# The lacuna is partially 
filled by Flood (1978) who constructs the first model in which 
expectations are formed rationally. This is then followed 
by the more comprehensive and persuasive models of Flood &
Marion (1982) and Cumby (1984).
Meanwhile a number of other authors have looked at how 
dual markets have worked out in practice. Lanyi (1975) draws 
general conclusions from the Belgian, French and Italian 
experience, as well as usefully summarising the rules that 
operated in those three markets. Otherwise, the Belgian 
experience has monopolised academic attention, being examined 
In Talent (1970), De Booper & Mountford (1975) and (most exten­
sively) in Decaluwe and Steinherr (1976) to which De Grauwe (1976) 
is a reply.
This Chapter follows the pattern that the literature 
has taken. Section II introduces the basic definition of a 
dual market and looks at some immediate consequences of that 
definition; the reasons for adopting such a system, the 
institutional arrangements required and the problems which will
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obviously arise. Section III looks at the work that has been 
done on the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy under 
dual exchange rate regimes. Section IV looks at the questions 
of expectations formation in, and stability of, dual markets. 
Finally, Section V summarises the conclusions that have been 
drawn from the operation of dual markets in practice.
II Definitions and First Consequences
It is widely agreed that one of the chief factors that 
undermined the Bretton—Woods system of fixed exchange rates was the
growth and growing volatility of international capital movements.
I
The idea of a dual system of exchange rates (henceforth 
d^^I mojket) was proposed as a means by which countries could 
prevent such flows from affecting the more normal run of their 
overseas transactions. In a dual market capital and current 
account transactions are conducted through separate foreign 
exchange markets. Terminology varies. Henceforth in this 
survey the market through which current account items are 
transacted will be referred to as the Commercial market, that 
for capital items the financial market. Since the primary 
aim oestablishing such a system is to accommodate speculative 
capital flows while insulating the commercial exchange rate 
from them, that rate has generally, both in practice and in 
theoretical studies, been kept fixed while the financial 
rate has floated. This assumption will be retained throughout, 
except where it is specifically stated otherwise.
Fleming (1971) looks in detail at the controls necessary 
to separate the financial and the commercial markets. The 
Government must establish extensive controls over at least 
one of the two categories of foreign exchange transaction
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[Carried out by domestic residents (usually the current items). 
They must also establish controls over the domestic currency 
transactions of non-residents — which has usually been done 
by separating non-resident accounts into two types, one 
for current transactions and one for capital transactions.
/ Assuming that the establishment of such controls effectively 
separates the commercial and financial markets, what is the 
effect on the international capital flows which gave rise to 
the idea in the first place? All authors note that the 
answer depends on the detail of the way in which the market 
is managed. Three possible effects are as follows:—
Capital Gains: Decisions about inflows of foreign 
capital will be affected by expectations about the 
future movement of the financial exchange rate, and 
the likely consequent gain or loss when the foreign 
investor comes to withdraw his capital. To the extent 
that the financial rate is expected, in the long run, 
to remain close to the (fixed) commercial rate this is 
a stabilising factor - if excess domestic demand for 
overseas capital causes the financial rate to rise to 
a premium over the commercial rate then (self-fulfilling) 
expectations of a subsequent fall will lead to a 
compensating fall in demand for overseas capital.
gates of Return: This depends on which market
is used for interest payments on overseas holdings of 
domestic capital and domestic holdings of foreign capital. 
There are two possibilities - the Belgian stvle of dual 
market where interest payments are converted at the
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financial rate, and the Italian style where they are 
converted at the commercial rate (the terminology is 
mine, the distinction is implicit in a lot of the 
literature without being systematically explored — in 
general the literature has concentrated on Italian style 
dual market systems while the Belgian style has been 
more prevalent in practice). In an Italian style 
dual market system the return on domestic capital 
held by foreigners can diverge from the domestic interest 
rate. In fact if the nominal domestic interest rate 
is r, the financial exchange rate is (units of 
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency) and 
the commercial exchange rate is then it is easy 
to see that the return earned by a unit of foreign 
currency invested domestically (through the financial 
market with the interest repatriated through the 
commercial market) is>
It.r
Cc
Thus as the financial rate varies so the rate of 
return on, and hence the demand for, domestic capital by 
foreigners also varies. Again this effect looks 
stabilising - inflows of foreign capital causa 'the financial 
rate to appreciate (ie, ç^. to fall) and so diminish the 
rate of return on such inflows. (It should be added
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however that Decaluwe and Steinherr 1976b have demon­
strated that in certain circumstances a Belgian style 
dual market can be stable when an Italian style is 
not - see below)
(c) Intervention Policy: A crucial determinant of 
the extent of capital inflows/outflows is the intervention 
policy of the authorities in the financial exchange market 
(by assumption their intervention policy in the commercial 
market is dictated by the need to keep the rate there 
fixed). This was first pointed out by Fleming (1971), 
although our terminology is that of Lanyi (1975). He 
makes the distinction between a policy of non-intervention — 
in which the financial rate floats freely — and a neutral 
intervention policy (first suggested by Barattieri and 
Ragazzi 1971) in which the monetary authority sells (buys) 
foreign exchange in the financial exchange market equal 
to the net increase (l6ss) in official reserves resulting 
from a current account surplus (deficit), Lanyi also 
emphasises that neutral intervention has the advantage
^^iGcting the very considerable leakages (eg"Leads and lags" 
see below) which must take place between the two markets.
All those authors who have examined dual markets run 
imder a policy of non-intervention have pointed out that in 
such circumstances ^LL net capital movements into or out of 
the country are choked off. For if, for example, a domestic 
resident wants to buy internationally traded securities he 
must either buy them from another domestic resident (no net 
capital flow) or purchase them from a foreigner. In the latter
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case he must first buy foreign exchange through the financial
market. But since that market is always balanced and, by
assumption, there is no external intervention, he can only
buy such foreign exchange if someone else is prepared ^o
sell — i.e. another domestic resident is selling foreign securities,
or a non-resident wishes to buy domestic securities - in either
case the net capital movement is nil.
Under a neutral intervention policy cn the other hand
there are net capital flows to the extent of the official
intervention, but there is also overall balance of payments 
equilibrium - with the imbalance on current account precisely 
offset by an equal and opposite imbalance on capital account.
It should be added, however, that (as pointed out by 
Fleming (1971)) in these circumstances the domestic currency 
accounts of the monetary authority will not necessarily be 
in equilibrium. Indeed (retaining the notation introduced 
above) if €f 4 and the current account balance (in
foreign currency terms) is Cr then in order to run a neutral 
intervention policy the monetary authority must add to the 
domestic money supply at a rate (&c- b .
This can of course be sterilised but it does mean that in such
circumstances the domestic economy is in a state of quasi­
equilibrium rather than true equilibrium (Boll (1976) has 
taken this analysis a little further - to point out that, 
other factors remaining constant, the financial exchange rate 
under a neutral intervention policy is explosively unstable 
under slight exogenous variations of the domestic money 
supply - for if starting from equilibrium the money supply 
rises, activity rises and the current account goes into deficit.
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domestic interest rates fall, there'is reduced overseas 
demand for domestic capital, rises, hy the mechanism 
described above, money supply rises again and so on).
These three mechanisms by which the introduction of a 
dual market can affect capital movements all depend on the 
ability of the authorities to set up a system of regulation 
effectively seperating capital and ohrrent flows. But, as 
a number of authors (Fleming I971, 1974, Lanyi 1975) 
have pointed out, it is impossible for practical reasons 
entirely to disentangle the current and capital accounts. 
Firstly there are a number of capital transactions which, in 
normal circumstances, it is impossible to divert out of the 
commercial market - notably changes in non-residents 
"commercial account " balances in domestic currency (hn 
important source of currency speculation in the past) and 
"leads and lags" on trade payments - all of which could be 
affected if, say, a devaluation of the commercial rate were 
expected. Secondly there are certain types of international 
transactions which, while technically current account items, 
can easily be used for the acquisition of foreign assets - 
these include remittances of savings by foreign workers, 
tourist expenditure and other cash transactions. Those 
transactions have therefore normally been channelled. : through 
the financial market. A third link may be created through the 
operation of forward markets - even when there are separate 
financial and "commercial" forward markets they can create 
indirect links between the two markets because e.g. if the 
financial forward rate is at a premium this could create
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expectations of a revaluation of the commercial rate with 
consequent speculative pressure. Finally Lanyi extensively 
chronicles the possibilities for false invoicing and other 
methods of ilegally channelling e.g. current payments through 
the financial market. The key point here is that the incentive 
for, and so the extent of, this kind of evasion will increase 
rapidly as the gap between the financial and the commercial 
rates widen. i
The existence of these limitations on the ability of the 
authorities to separate current and capital transactions 
raises the question of how the use of dual markets compares 
with other means of controlling autonomous capital flows.
Fleming (1974-) looks at a range of such alternatives and 
reaches the following conclusions;
quantitative restrictions on capital movements; the dual
market system has the advantage over these of being automatic
and of allocatin^unds efficiently among different types of
capital flow (Fleming also claims that they are cheaper to
administer, but Lanyi points out that this is not necessarily
the case if the costs of double bookeeping for overseas
accounts is taken into consideration), However it is more
likely to give rise to disequilibrating exchange rate speculation
e.g. if the market takes a wide gap between the two rates as a
signal that the commercial rate needs to be devalued.
forward exchance market intervention: forward market intervention
can affect leads and lags, which dual markets cannot. On the
other hand forward market intervention can be expensive and
chiefly affects only those foreign exchange transactions which
are covered in the forward market. Fleming concludes that 
this is a useful adjunct to the use of dual markets.
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^ scal and monetary policy: the use of a dual market is much
more rapidly responsive to conditions in the market place and 
is less likely to interfere with the achievement of other 
macroeconomic objectives.
fixed exchange rate, borrowing abroad where necessary; a dual 
market relieves official reserves from the effect of volatile 
capital movements (with their monetary consequences) - but 
distorts economic activity more and (under a policy of neutral 
intervention ) may conceal a fundamental imbalance in the 
commercial market larger than would be possible with 
fixed rates.
^gating exchange rates: dual rates are more distortive, and
less able to respond to deep underlying imbalances in the current
account, but do provide an environment of greater exchange
rate stability for foreign trade provided the commercial rate is 
set at a realistic level.
Fleming concludes that dual rates have important advantages 
over most of the other major methods of controlling autonomous 
capital flows. In view of the danger, however, that they may 
conceal persistent disequilibria he suggests that a hybrid system 
may be worth examination - in effect this would be a dual 
market run under a neutral intervention policy in which the 
commercial exchange rate instead of being fixed would be 
subject to a managed float in line with long run trends in 
the current account. This idea has received little follow 
up in the literature.the only two references to such a system 
being a brief comment in Lanyi (who notes that the effectiveness 
of a hybrid market are bound to depend on the intervention 
policy adopted, and that it exposes the commercial exchange 
rate to speculative pressures) and its inclusion as one of the
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exchange rate systems examined in Flood and Marion (1982).
Nor has it been employed, in its pure form, in practice, 
although the currentBelgian system in which the fixed level 
of the "commercial" franc in the EMS is subject to frequent 
small readjustments is quite close to it.
iîî Puai Rates and the. Instruments of Econnmin Policy
Mundell and Fleming have demonstrated that for a small 
open economy under perfect capital mobility the effectiveness 
of fiscal and monetary policy for domestic activity depends 
on the exchange rate regime. Under fixed rates fiscal policy
works and monetary policy does not, while under flexible rates 
the reverse is true.
Since a dual rate system has some of the qualities of fixed 
rates, and some of floating, it is plainly of interest to consider 
the effects of fiscal and monetary policy under them. A number 
of authors (in particular Boll, 1975) have looked at this question, 
for example, using the standard IS/LM diagram shown, consider the 
effect, under a dual currency system with non-intervention, 
of a rise in the money supply from LM to LM*,
The economy will begin to 
move from point A to 
point B. If there were 
a unified fixed exchange 
rate, the outflow of 
capital provoked by the 
incipient fall in domestic
%
interest rates from r^ to rB y
would reverse the rise in money supply and take the economy 
back to point A. Since, however, as noted above, there can be
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no net capital movement in a dual rate system with non-intervention 
the effect is instead of greater demand for foreign exchange on 
the financial market and a rise in Cç. • The consequence of this 
Ls different according to whether we have a Belgian type or 
Italian type dual market;
(i) in an Italian type market a rise in implies a rise 
in domestic interest rates as seen by outsiders (and a fall in 
overseas interest rates as seen by domestic residents). So 
the economy can move to point B while the financial rate 
depreciates to the point where ^
and this is a quasi-equilibrium (the current account is of 
course in deficit). It follows that under an Italian tvne 
dual market with non-intervention monetary policy is effective 
lu.. adjusting the level of domestic activity (Swoboda, 1974 
emphasises that this is not a sustainable equilibrium due to 
the imbalance on the current account - we will return to this 
point below ) - it is also worth noting that under flexible 
rates the economy would move to point C - a greater effect 
on income than under dual rates.
(ii) in & Belgian type dual market on the other hand the 
interest rate effect does not operate. Hence within this 
model there is no way of eliminating the surplus demand for 
foreign exchange on the financial market. rises perpetually.
This evident inadequacy of the framework to describe
the workings of a Belgian type dual market leads to two 
interesting conclusions;
(a) the decision in a dual market system as to which market 
interest rates should be paid through is more significant 
than it may initially appear. More precisely, an Italian
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type decision to channel interest payments through the 
commercial market establishes a direct link between 
monetary conditions and the overseas account which 
otherwise does not exist.
(b) quite clearly in a Belgian type market cannot
respond to a rise in money supply by rising perpetually -
and the best hypothesis to eliminate this possibility
(in a perfect theoretical world where leakage between
current and capital transactions can be prevented) must
be on the e_xpectations generated by a steadily growing
gap between the financial and commercial rates. This
is a first indication of the importance of expectations
in the working of a dual market system, to which we will 
return below.
Confining our attention for the remainder of this section 
to Italian type markets it is possible to demonstrate by similar 
analysis to that above that fiscal -policy is also effective in 
^justin_g the level of domestic activity in a dual market with 
^-intervention (the only difference being that while monetary 
expansion leads to a depreciation of the financial rate, fiscal 
expansion leads to an appreciation). The same kind of analysis 
shows that the same conclusions apply to dual markets under 
ë.e}:tral intervention - an unsurprising result given that, from the 
point of view of this model, the only difference between 
non-intervention and neutral intervention is that in the former 
there is no net capital movement, and in the latter there is just 
enough to offset any change in the state of the current account. 
(Since these results are not entirely clear in Boll they are 
given in Appendix I.)
—  14 —
Boil goes on to use the same type of analysis to consider 
the possibility of achieving under four different exchange rate 
regimes (fixed rate, floating rate, dual with non-intervention 
and dual with neutral intervention) a variety of macroeconomic 
tar^ts; full employment (i.e. Y=Yo), external balance, and 
optimal growth (i.e. r=r^). Clearly the/last objective is 
not meaningful (at least for unified exchange rate systems) 
under perfect capital mobility, a hypothesis which he therefore 
drops in favour of high capital mobility (i.e. the external, 
balance curve at equilibrium and the prevailing exchange rat©(s) 
has a lower slope than the LTi curve; '
■Jÿjs-.So < )
* = e • €o
On this assumption both fiscal and monetary policy are effective.
(to varying extents) under all four exchange rate regimes.- 
It follows rather straightforwardly that under thOse two regimes 
where external balance is guaranteed (floating rates and dual 
markets with neutral intervention) use of fiscal and monetary 
policy is enough to bring the economy to quasi-equilibrium at 
a point where all three oojectives are met. «ith the other two 
regimes however (fixed rates and dual markets with non-intervention) 
the authorities have only two instruments with which to pursue 
three objectives and thus will not be able to achieve them all, 
except by chance.
Decaluwe and Steinherr (1976a) also consider the question 
of whether the introduction of dual markets might help the 
policymaker simultaneously to achieve several macro—economic 
objectives. In particular they point out that whereas a deficit
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in the capital account' does not effect domestic wealth, a 
deficit in the current account does. There may he circumstances 
therefore, in which the authorities will wish to set separate 
targets for net international indebtedness and the level of 
international reserves. Would the establishment of a dual market 
be an appropriate mechanism for this? To help answer this 
question they set up an elaborate portfolio balance model
i ■
of a small economy with an Italian style dual, exchange market.
operating under non-intervention. In order to complete their
model they have to introduce the (appealing but arbitrary)
hypothesis that the expected future value of the two exchange
rates appreciates with the balance of trade, and can depend also
on the current gap between the two rates (although speculative
movements of the trade balance in response to these expectations
i.e. 'leads and Lags" are excluded). Their chief conclusions 
are as follows:-
i) In the short run, on a comparative static analysis, 
the introduction of a dual exchange market does ma^e it 
possible for the authorities to pursue seperate targets 
for net international indebtedness and the level of 
international reserves. Furthermore, as under IS/LM 
analysis, both fiscal and monetary policy are effective 
economic instruments even when international capital is 
highly mobile.
ii) In the long run equilibrium, and contrary to 
Swoboda s conclusion quoted above, monetary policy can 
effectively influence long run income and the level of 
domestic interest rates, provided that expectations
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of the future commercial and financial rates are formed 
independently of one another (i.e. dependence oh the 
'gap' IS zero). This is because Swoboda's IS/LM analysis 
does not include interest payments on foreign debt.
As noted above if it is possible in long run equilibrium 
to have e^ f (which can be done when their expected 
values are independent of the gap between them) then 
it is possible to have a domestic interest rate 
less than/greater than the international interest rate, 
and so to run a trade account surplus/deficit while still 
remaining in current account equilibrium.
Marion (1981) pursues the portfolio balance approach
but reworks the Decaluwe and Steinherr model so as to establish
a more vigorous distinction between stock and flow items.
Assuming static expectations she then uses this model to
examine the effectiveness of a dual system in insulating the
economy from overseas disturbances. Her chief conclusion,
to which we will return below, is that (assuming overseas
bonds are of a certain type) dual rates, unlike fixed and
flexible rates, can completely insulate the domestic economy
from variations in the overseas interest rate (such movement,
being sterilised by compensating movements in the financial
exchange rate - which tes no effect on the real economy due
to the rigorous segregation of financial and commodity sectors 
in this model).
Aizenmann (1983) uses a variant of the Marion portfolio 
balance model to compare the short_term effects of domestic
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monetary policy and devaluation of the (commercial)
exchange rate under fixed rates and Italian type dual rates.
He shows that under dual rates, the impacts of these policy 
actions on domestic interest rates are sharper, hut more 
transient, than the same changes under unified fixed rates.
He also demonstrates that these results hold under both static 
and rational expectations. Much of his argument, in the static 
expectations case, is capable of substantial simplification 
Csee appendix II). Obstfeld (1984) takes the analysis of the 
effects of devaluation on a dual rate economy considerably 
further, showing in particular that inclusion of the assumption 
that central bank foreign reserves earn interest results in 
devaluation becoming non-neutral - i.e. having a real impact 
on the long term equilibrium of the economy.
IV Expectations and Stability
As remarked above, the IS/LM analysis of Bon is 
inadequate to study the effects of policy changes on Belgian 
style dual exchange markets because in such markets there is 
no direct link between monetary conditions and the balance 
of payments. Some new hypothesis is needed to re-establish 
that link, and the most appropriate such hypothesis will 
probably concern expected future values of the financial 
exchange rate.
Such a model was set up by Argy and Porter (1972).
They examine the response of a small open economy under a 
variety of exchange rate regimes and perfect capital mobility 
to a number of exogenous disturbances, including variations
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in fiscal and monetary policy, and in the external interest 
rate. The model is a straightforward comparitive static model 
incorporating (in the incarnation which interests us here) 
a si®^ style dual exchange market without Government 
intervention. The key assumptions are;
i) the forward (= expected) rate on the financial 
market is given by;
where > is a constant reflecting the elasticity of 
expectations. -i 4 X ( I
ii) demand for net overseas debt (the level of which 
must remain constant under a non-intervention policy) 
depends upon the expected return on such debt;
Q =- g f \ where r* =
€ç. / international interest rate
fiumiing this model gives rise to the following interesting results;
a) when >’=■0 (i.e. expectations are static) we are 
back in the situation of the Bsil model where the money 
market is overdefined, the domestic interest rate being 
fixed by international capital mobility, and domestic 
supply of money being held fixed by the impossibility 
of net capital flow. As with Bon the model does not 
work in this case.
b) if X+o then income and interest rates are 
completely independent of the precise value given to A 
(i.e., on a comparative static analysis, the existence 
of non-static expectations for the financial rate are
a necessary part of the model, but the precise nature
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of those expectations do not affect the results that' 
the model yields).
c) in a Belgian type dual market with expectations 
monetary policy is effective in adjusting national income 
(e.g. a rise in money supply will lead to a fall in the 
domestic interest rate and expansion of output. The 
resulting imbalance of demand in the financial market
Be accomodated by a movement of the spot and foriiard 
financial rates in such a way that
f- r* + _ g
Cç
and hence the financial market remains balanced. The 
only effect of A taking different values is that the 
spot and forward rates move by varying amounts) - although, 
as with Italian type markets, the effect on income is less 
than would be produced by the same monetary expansion 
under unified flexible exchange rates.
d) an analogous argument demonstrates that under the 
same assunptions fiscal policy is also effective in 
adjusting national income.
e) Argy and Porter also consider the effect of an 
exogenous shift in international interest rates,
r and y are insulated from this and remain unchanged, 
the pressure on the capital market being again absorbed 
by compensating movements in the spot and forward 
financial rate. This contrasts quite sharply with the 
behaviour of the same model under fixed or flexible 
unified rates, where domestic income is affected bv
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exogenous shifts in r*, and demonstrates that, in this 
model at least, the existence of a dual market is 
effective protection against international capital 
movements.
■ I
Flood (1978) supports the view originally expressed by 
Fleming (1971) and subsequently supported in^the work of 
Decaluwe and Steinherr, Dorbusch and Argy and Porter that 
the process of expectations formation is central to any 
analysis of how dual exchange markets work. He points out 
however that the forms of expectation formation used by 
these previous authors has tended to be ad hoc - and may 
therefore be assuming away an important part of the story 
of dual markets. He therefore sets up a monetary model of 
a small fully employed open economy under perfect capital 
mobility with an Italian type dual market operating with no 
government intervention. Expectations are introduced, as 
in Argy and Porter, through the expected rate of return on 
internationally traded securities;
p(t-) -, îf .
and the model is driven by independent stochastic variations 
of mean o in domestic credit and the international interest 
rate, r*. Finally, the distinctive feature of the model, 
expectations of the financial exchange rate are assumed to 
be formed rationally in the sense of Muth _ the expected 
value of e^( t+i) is its mathematical expectation at time t.
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The Most interesting result to emerge from Flood's 
analysis is that, contrary to the assumption made by 
Decaluwe and Steinherr (1976a) the expected financial exchange 
Appreciates as the current account improves. On 
inspection the reason is simple - a current account surplus 
leads to an expanding money supply, and hence the opportunity 
cost of holding money (i.e. f(A) must fall - so e^ must rise.
Flood and Marion (1982) take this approach considerably 
further by completely rebuilding the Argy-Forter model in a 
rational expectations mould. In effect their new model is a 
variant of the Dornbusch and Fischer approach in which the 
exchange rate is set by capital movements, and balance on the 
current account is achieved, over time, by the effect of asset 
movements working through the wealth effect. As in Flood's 
earlier model, expectations play a role through the expected 
rate of return on domestically held international securities 
and those expectations are again assumed rational. This 
sophisticated apparatus (which is not solved in detail) is 
designed, and used, to examine the question of what proportion 
of wage contracts should, optimally, be indexed against price 
movements under four different exchange rate systemsî 
unified fixed, unified floating, what we have called Italian 
dual, and a fourth systems which is our Italian dual system 
in which the commercial rate too is allowed to float. The 
central conclusion of the paper is that the optimal level of 
wage indexation (and hence the central structural equations 
of the system) will depend upon which exchange rate system is 
adopted and, in particular, that 100% indexation is optimal for
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(and only for) those two exchange rate systems where the exchange 
rate for commercial transactions is fixed. Moreover if 100% 
indexation is adopted under such systems then it completely 
insulates the level of domestic production from overseas 
disturbances (i.e. rediscovering Marion's. 198I result from a 
different direction). In a final section the authors show 
that their results do not extend to the case where the economy 
has influence over the price of its own products in export 
markets.
Cumby (1984) goes some way to fill this lacuna by 
adapting the Dorbusch/Fischer approach, with perfect foresight 
and a dual exchange rate system, to an economy possessing 
market power. His chief conclusions (both of which will be 
re-examined in the context of the more precise analysis 
provided by the model in Chapter II below) are that such a 
system always exhibits the saddle point stability necessary 
for rational expectations models, and (again) that the dual 
exchange rate system completely insulates the domestic economy 
from variations in the overseas interest rate. He also shows 
that under such a régime the monetary authority is able 
(through open market operations) to exert long term control 
over the domestic money supply and interest rate, but not to 
sterilise the long term effects of variation in overseas 
price levels.
Finally for this section we look briefly at the only 
model hitherto which looks at the effect of government 
intervention. This is in Decaluwe and Steinherr (1976b).
They assume that a proportion ( i—&) of the current account 
deficit is financed from the financial market (i.e. * 1
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means non-intervention, -o means neutral intervention).
^he rates of change of the domestic interest rate 
and financial exchange rate are assumed to be proportional 
to tie excess demand in the money and traded capital markets 
respectively, and the expected future value of the financial 
exchange rate (upon which net demand for capital inflows/outflows 
is assumed to depend) is assumed to depend only on the domestic 
interest rate (overseas parameters, including the overseas 
interest rate being assumed constant)and to appreciate as 
the domestic interest rate rises.
From this rather ad hoc, if plausible, set of hypotheses 
Decaluwe and Steinherr derive the following conclusions;
a) If the market is run under Italian type rules then 
there is a possibility that it is unstable, depending upon 
the values given to the various parameters. Assuming that 
interest rates and capital flows respond rapidly to 
imbalances in their respective markets, however, it is 
clear that « becomes a key parameter. More precisely 
the higher the level of official intervention in the financial 
market the more likely it is to be stable. The reason for 
^Mis is that, in the absence of intervention, a current account 
suplus increases domestic money supply. This exerts downward 
pressure on the domestic interest rate and creates excess 
demand for foreign exchange in the financial market and a 
depreciation of the financial rate. Furthermore the fall 
in the domestic interest rate improves the current account 
further, by reducing overseas interest payments, and in
certain circumstances the process can become explosive.
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With official intervention, however, part of the current 
account surplus is sold on the financial market,, so the money 
supply rises less, interest rates fall less and an explosion 
is less likely.
b) The above conclusions are still valid if one introduces, 
the additional hypothesis that capital flows are negatively 
affected by expectations of a fall in the commercial rate
if the discount of the financial rate against the commercial 
rate widens (i.e. the "leads and lags" effect).
c) If the same model is run under Belgian type rules, it is 
always stable, whatever the level of Government intervention. 
This is because the interest rate link between monetary 
conditions and the current account is broken and hence the 
sort of instability described above is not possible. ('The 
model in Chapter II below shows that the introduction of 
rational expectations leads to entirely different conclusions 
about the effects on stability of varying levels of Government 
intervention.)
V Dual Markets in Practice
The most successful, or at least most enduring, dual 
exchange market has been that in existence in the Belgium/ 
Luxembourg Exchange Union since 1951* It has consequently 
also received the lion's share of academic attention (and, 
conversely, a disproportionately large number of the academics 
who have studied two tier markets have been Belgians). In 
particular, undoubtedly the fullest and most thorough study 
of a dual exchange market operating in practice is that by 
Decaluwe and Steinherr (197Gb) on the Belgian experience in 
the years 1961-71. The paper concentrates on three questions:
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a) granted that there is bound to be same leakage 
between the two markets, was it nevertheless possible 
to establish an effective split between capital and 
current flows?
I
b; if so, did this have the desired effect of 
controlling exogenous capital movements?
/
c) was monetary policy, as predicted by theory, an 
effective macro-economic instrument under a dual I
exchange rate regime?
Decaluwe and Steinherr open their paper by summarising ,
the structure of the Belgian dual exchange market in the period 
I96I-7I. It was a Belgian-type market (i.e. interest payable
through the financial market) with the additional peculiarity
that capital outflows (but not inflows) could take place
through the commercial market - the immediate consequence of
which is that the financial rate can be at a discount, but
not a premium^to the commercial rate. The chief features of
the markets operation in the period under consideration
were as follows;
i) throughout most of the period there was very limited
divergence of the two exchange rates (usually less than 1%),
partly because of world financial stability and partly because
of countercyclical purchases of foreign debt by the Belgian
public sector when the financial rate was at a discount.
ii) there was a firm correlation throughout the period
between the strength of the current account and the level of
the financial rate. As the current account went into deficit
so the financial rate fell i.e. "leads and lags" and other
linkages between the current and capital accounts were enough
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to ensure that they weakened or strengthened together.
Tii) following from (ii) there was also a strong correlation 
between the differential between domestic and international 
interest rates and the exchange rate differential.
iv) since this was a Belgian type system, the major influence 
on capital flows was the expected movement of the financial rate. 
The evidence of the period is that in 1966, 1968 and 1969 major 
capital outflows were discouraged by a falling financial rate 
(on those three occasions the exchange rate differential 
opened to a point wider than the interest rate differential).
v) throughout the period up to 1970 the monetary authorities 
pursued a neutral intervention policy, selling on the 
financial market the foreign exchange resulting from the current 
account surplus Belgium had in those years.
vi) however, at the time of the exchange rate crisis of 1971, 
when the current account went into deficit and there was strong 
speculative pressure on the financial franc the authorities 
felt unable to finance the current account by intervening 
against the financial franc (as they would have had to do).
At the same time there was considerable arbitrage within the 
domestic banking system (which at that time was inadequately 
regulated) tending to further weaken the financial franc, 
as well as considerable extra "leakage" between the two accounts. 
As a result the authorities were finally forced to impose 
quantitative controls on movements of capital for a short time,
vii) Decaluwe and Steinherr suggest that the key difference 
between 1971 and the period that preceded it is that in I97I 
the authorities were confronted with outflows on both capital
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and current accounts, whereas before the two accounts had been 
pushing in different directions. A dual market system may be 
more effective in curbing sudden capital movements in the first 
case than in the second.
viii) Decaluwe and Steinherr then construct a model of the 
financial and exchange markets incorporating the linkages noted 
above, and estimate the various parameters on the basis of 
the 1961-71 experience. They get quite a good fit, and arrive 
at the following answers to the three questions they raised 
at the start of their analysis;
(a) In normal circumstances, the dual market did 
achieve an effective separation between capital and 
current payments. When the exchange rate differential 
became sizeable however leakage and speculation transactions 
in the commercial market grew and it became increasingly 
difficult to separate the two markets.
(b) Up to 1971 the existence of the dual market did 
reduce the effect of exogenous capital movements.
(c) Monetary policy was apparently more effective 
under the dual market regime than might otherwise have 
been expected. Only about 37% of changes in the 
domestic money stock were offset by reserve movements.
De Grauwe (1976) criticises most of Decaluwe and Steinherrs 
conclusions. He points out that the Belgian experience in 
1971 and subsequently shows that the dual market cannot control 
major speculative movements, and so the system is most effective 
when least needed. The proceeds from the effective 'tax' 
imposed on capital outflows by the dual market system went to
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those who arbitraged illegally between the two markets.
The "offset coefficient" of 57%, demonstrating the relative 
autonomy of the money supply in Belgium did no such thing.
The corresponding coefficient for Holland, under unified 
fixed rates, was 59%- And comparing movements of Belgian 
and Dutch interest rates with Eurodollar rates suggested 
that all tended to move together - again casting doubts 
on claims of greater Belgian monetary autonomy. Finally 
de Grauwe concludes that the Belgian dual market prior to 
1971 operated as a mercantilistic device - preventing a 
current account surplus from being balanced by capital outflows 
Lanyi (1975) asks similar questions to Decaluwe and 
Steinherr in a more impressionistic way, but on the basis of 
a wider sample. He looks at the records of the French, Italian 
and Belgian dual market systems from two points of view;
(a) how effective have they been in defending the 
exchange rate against speculative movements of capital; 
and (b) have they contributed to the achievement of other 
balance of payments objectives e.g. maintenance of a 
certain level of reserves and a certain capital flow, 
or maintenance of long term equilibrium.
On (a) his answer is "not very". He notes that if 
speculative flows are to be contained then the market must 
be able to maintain'wi4.e spreacfe between the two exchange 
rates when necessary. In fact spreads have tended to remain 
below 5/*^ and at times of heavy speculative pressure the 
authorities have hgd to impose direct controls on capital 
movements and/or alter the commercial exchange rate. Lanyi
—  29 —
suggests that the reason why wide spreads cannot he sustained 
is that they increase the incentive to evade the split between 
the two markets to the point where the two markets become 
powerfully linked. But if it is not possible to achieve a
wide spread then the prospect of earning significant capital 
gains by buying bonds through the financial market disappears, 
and speculative pressures on the financial market tend to 
spill over to the commercial market as well.
On (b) Lanyi reaches the following conclusions;
i) If long run balance of payments equilibrium is desired 
then in the long term, the authorities must follow a neutral 
intervention policy. In practice, however, experience shows 
that they have preferred a non-intervention policy (and to 
that extent dual markets have not received a proper test in 
reality) - apparently because of fears that if they are seen
to intervene in the financial market they may provoke speculation 
and evasion (especially if e.g. they are forced to intervene 
the 'wrong' way when the current account is in deficit and the 
financial rate at a discount).
ii) Hence as a matter of fact governments have felt the need 
to keep both markets in rough balance (and the PEG Government 
decided not to introduce a dual market in I97I precisely 
because it knew it could not do this).
iii) Dual markets should be an effective way of pursuing two 
separate exchange rate targets provided the emphasis is given 
to the current account (since the capital account will always 
be affected by short term reversible movements).
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iv) Finally the existence of a dual market does provide
an effective system for signalling a basic disequilibrium in
the balance of payments (i.e. a persistent divergence in one
direction of the financial rate from the commercial rate
under neutral intervention);^ the existence of such a
divergence is likely to be less effective in compelling an
exchange rate change than e.g. the steady loss of reserves 
under fixed rates.
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Appendix I
Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under an Italian Type 
Dual Market
A. Fiscal Policy
(i) non-intervention
%s
We assume perfect capital flow throughout. The state of the current 
account depends only on Y and is in balance at Y^. At the initial 
equilibrium A: Y = Y^ ^ e^  = e^ and r = r* (the international interest 
rate). Fiscal expansion now takes place moving IS to IS' and the 
economy to B. r rises to r^ (say) and the rise in interest rates
causes the financial rate to rise until
B is now a qua si equil ibrium, with the current account in deficit. 
In the long term however the fall in reserves will cause the money 
supply to fall to LM; and the economy to move to point C with 
interest rate r^. The financial rate will continue to appreciate 
until ^
and this is now a long term equilibrium with the current account 
back in balance. Y = Y^ again, but the interest rate and e^ have 
changed.
(ii) neutral intervention:
Using the same diagram as above with the same initial 
equilibrium and the same expansion to IS' the economy moves 
to B and as before the financial rate appreciates until
and the overseas account in balance because the deficit on 
current account (b) is financed through capital inflows.
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B is nevertheless still only a quasiequilibrium because the 
monetary authorities are creating domestic money at a rate 
(©Ç - e^)b - which is negative. So, as before, the money 
supply falls moving LM tn LM' and the economy to a sustainable 
equilibrium at c.
B. Monetary Policy
(i) non-intervention r
LM'
V
Our economy is initially at equilibrium at A as above. The money 
supply is now expanded to LM'. The Economy moves to B. The 
Financial rate now depreciates until ^
at which point B is a quasiequilibrium. But the current account 
is in deficit and in long term the outflow of reserves causes the 
money supply to fall and the economy moves back to A.
(ii) neutral intervention
Using the same diagram, initial equilibrium etc as above, B 
is again a quasiequilibrium where the balance of payments deficit 
(b) is now financed through the financial market. But at B the 
rate of creation of money (e^ - e^)b is positive - so the money 
supply continues indefinitely to expand and there is no long 
term equilibrium.
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C. Anti-Swoboda
Decaluwe and Steinherrs answer to Swobodas claim that, 
under non-intervention, it is not possible to use fiscal and 
monetary policy in a dual market to affect the equilibrium 
value of Y. ?
Taking interest payments on overseas debt into account the 
current account (balanced along line cc) is interest rate
dependent. Now moving from IiN to LM’ and IS to IS'we move our economy
to point B. e^ again adjusts until
and the current account is balanced since B lies on cc. So B is a
sustainable equilibrium with Vg 4
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Appendix II
Aizenmann simplified:
We have a small open economy with fixed output, wealth 
effect etc. Domestic wealth W consists of three assets; 
domestic bonds (of which there is a.fixed quantity X), domestic 
money M and overseas bonds to total (domestic currency) value e^F, 
where e^ the financial exchange rate may be fixed and unified 
with the commercial rate, or floated apart from it. Holders 
preferences amongst these three types of asset will be affected 
in . obvious ways by variations in r, the domestic interest 
rate. In particular a fall in r will lead to disposals of 
domestic bonds, some greater disposition to hold money, and 
purchases of overseas bonds which - where e^ floats - will 
simply result in a bidding down of the financial exchange rate.
We then have the following diagram;
X
V3i . 
w, .
'f
r u)
Here the curve XX gives those values of r which, at 
varying levels of W and under a system of dual exchange rates, 
results in holdings of domestic bonds of just X. As noted 
above this curve will oe downv/ard sloping.X’X' is the corresponding 
locus under fixed rates. The key point to note is that X'X' 
is steep-r than XX, J-his is because under dual rates the rate 
of return on domestically held overseas bonds (= A f  
will diminish as r diminishes (and so, as noted above, e« rises)
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whereas under fixed rates it is fixed. Thus the disposition to 
continue to hold domestic bonds as interest rates fall will be 
greater under dual rates than under fixed rates. The point A 
is of course where e^ = e^, the long term equilibrium.
Now suppose there is a rise in domestic money supply 
Under fixed rates this will raise wealth from to 
Under dual rates it will raise wealth further, say to W^, because 
the resulting fall in interest rates will lead to a rise in 
e^ and so in e^F. So under fixed rates the economy 
moves initially to point B, and under dual rates to point C 
i.e. under dual rates the rise in interest rates is sharper.
•The wealth effect will now result in a current account deficit 
which will gradually restore the economy to equilibrium - again 
it is clear that this will operate more sharply in the case of 
dual rates than fixed rates (assisted by the fact that under 
fixed rates there will also have been some conversion of domestic 
money into overseas bonds resulting in an extra inflow of 
interest payments).
A very similar argument, with the same result, can be 
constructed for a devaluation (i.e. a rise in e^) coupled with 
arise in the same proportion in X (to neutralise the effect 
on the long term equilibrium). Indeed, if the shift from X to 
e^X (with e^> 1) results in the curve *xoc moving to XX, and
ot'pc* moving to X'X' we have ^ (assuming constant returns
r
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under fixed rates the initial breakdown of wealth becomes 
w, r 4 6cP and the economy moves to a point
like B. Under dual rates s M +  4
and Qç. < (c because if cp 55. the (domestic) value
of overseas bonds held is greater as a proportion of total 
domestic wealth than at position A, while the return on 
them is the same or less (and the return on domestic bonds 
is certainly higher). So the economy moves to a point like C
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CHAPTER TWO: A RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL OF A DUAL EXCHANGE MARKET
I. Introduction
The model below goes beyond previous rational expectations 
models of dual exchange markets (notably those described in ,
Chapter I, of Flood and Marion (1982) and Cumby (1984) in a 
number of ways; ,
a) it is the first rational expectations model of an 
economy with market power which allows for a precise ' 
comparison of the insulation properties of dual exchange 
rates with other exchange rate regimes;
b) it explicitly incorporates the possibility of 
Government intervention between the two exchange markets ;
c) it allows for an analysis of the effectiveness of 
dual rates against other exchange systems in circumstances 
where only imperfect information is available.
The chief conclusions that follow from the model are that
for an open economy producing a differentiated product and with
sensible parameter values a dual exchange rate system is more
effective than either fixed or floating unified rates in
insulating domestic economic activity from the effect of external
capital movements, and no less effective in insulating it from
external price changes. We derive this conclusion both when
overseas prices and interest rates oscillate randomly about some
fixed and known equilibrium (or trend) and when they follow a
random walk on which policymakers only have imperfect information.
It also remains true, but diminishingly so, if the Government
intervenes between the two markets e.g. by transferring a
proportion of the balance of payments surplus on current trans-
actions from the commercial market foreign exchange pool to the 
financial market pool.
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This chapter is arranged as follows. Part II sets up a 
general model of an open economy which is adaptable for the 
three exchange rate régimes under examination. Part III 
describes those régimes. In parts IV, V and VI the model is 
solved under those régimes on the assumption that external 
prices and interest rates are set by white noise processes 
about some fixed point. Part VII compares those solutions 
and part VUC extends the results to the case where external 
prices and interest rates follow a random walk with imperfect 
information.
II The Model
Our model is an adaptation and elaboration of the model 
of Dornbusch and Fischer (1980), in which the exchange rate 
is set by capital movements, and balance on the current account 
is achieved, over time, by the effect of asset movements 
working through the wealth effect.
Specifically we assume an open economy producing a
differentiated product. We allow domestic holdings of two
types of asset:foreign bonds and foreign money. Domestic
money supply is assumed to consist of the latter plus a
constant element of domestic credit. Domestically held
domestic bonds are not excluded but are assumed to make a net
contribution of zero to domestically held wealth (since their
effect on the behaviour of borrowers and lenders will be
equal and opposite). The same applies to the domestic
capital stock and domestic credit and the Government sector (where 
holdings of Government bonds are offset by expected future tax 
liabilities). Following Dornbusch and Fishcher we assume that 
Foreign Bonds are ■.denominated in real terms, but unlike them we 
assume that they return interest
/at
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at the current overseas rate (which seems likely to be a more 
realistic approximation than their assumption that they return 
interest at a fixed rate).
Now, allowing capital and|current foreign exchange 
transactions to take place at different rates we have the 
following equations; /
u)Vv€r€ e t = e\ or €% ,
3) 4 4(1,q>b,. - - Sijl, ( C|. - -Cj. 4^^.^
- 4 ft (ph* ^
4) 4^41 4 p, (bv^,- -s. 4 (1,^04 Tv(^h 4 Pj. - 'Ifa^Y
5) \ c4 4M(.) - P^. = - <xr^ 4-%4
Where, at this stage, we assume all variables are small
divergences from equilibrium, and all are logs except
Notation is as follows;
= output
ft = domestic price level
= domestic interest rate
r* = overseas interest rate (assumed exogenous)
= exchange rate for capital transactions
('financial'exchange rate)
= exchange rate for current transactions 
('commercial' exchange rate)
^ = equilibrium domestic interest rate
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= domestic holdings of foreign currency
V/j. = domestic holdings of overseas bonds
1*
Pfc = overseas price level (assumed exogenous)
The explaiiation (as opposed to the derivation, which 
being anaesthetic is relegated to appendix I) of these 
equations is as follows;
Equation 1 the standard Lucas-Sargent surprise supply function
Equation 2 is;the interest rate parity equation. It assumes
perfect capital mobility and equates the expected returns on 
capital held domestically (on the lefthand side) with that for 
capital held overseas (on the right). The value of 
will depend on whether interest on domestically held overseas 
bonds is paid through the financial market (when «-t = )
or through the commercial market (when . We have
called the latter possibility an 'Italian type' dual market, 
and the former a 'Belgian type'. We will henceforth confine 
our attention to Belgian type dual markets. The major 
differences for Italian type markets are noted in appendix III. 
Equation 3 equates, at overseas prices, accumulation of
overseas assets (on the lefthand side)to net domestic deferred 
consumption (on the right). The latter comprises the following 
components ;
i) interest on domestic holdings of overseas bonds
p,r* 4 ?t-)
ii) the fall in consumption (so rise in deferred
consumption) brought about, through the wealth 
effect, by a change in holdings of foreign assets;
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iii) the rise in domestic saving:
iv) the fall in domestic investment:
' Equation 4 is the demand equation (in terms of overseas
prices) for traded goods. It says that the net accumulation 
of overseas assets (the lefhand side) is equal to the sum of 
: interest on domestic holdings of overseas bon^s;
 ^ (see Appendix for explanation as
to why this differs from corresponding term in
) '
equation 3)
ii) a term proportional to the improvement in the
terms of trade: 4p* "Pt)
(Note that by assuming we are assuming the
Marshall-Eerner condition). 
til) 8. term negatively proportioned to domestic income
Equation 3 is the demand for money equation where I
reflects the proportionality between the equilibrium level of 
) domestic credit and holdings of foreign money.
We also have the following comments on the Parameters;
a) g, is the ratio of the value of foreign bonds
to the value of foreign money held in equilibrium, r^ 
is the equilibrium domestic interest rate and s^ the 
proportion of wealth transformed into current consumntion. 
So tiC' . Quite clearly if then wealth earns
interest faster than it is spent gad our model is 
unstable. We exclude this possibility and in fact 
assume r^ reasonably small, small enough to exclude
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various other, similar, possibilities for instability 
which will appear as our analysis proceeds.
b) <o) f\ (see appendix)
c) since all our variables except are logs
all of our parameters can be expected to be 0(1) except 
for ec and which can be expected to be )
i.e. in general those two parameters will be significantly 
larger than the others.
d) T* 4 ( (see appendix)
III The Exchange Rate Régimes
Our model is incomplete. We have five equations in
seven unknowns ( ^4, ft ,  ^  ^ y
The Government is free to impose two additional constraints 
by its choice of exchange rate régime. We consider three 
possibilities.
a) fixed unified rates;
The Government imposes *0 . Equation 2
becomes ^
b) floating unified rates
The Government imposes t^ but allows the value of
this variable to be set in each period by the market. This
still leaves the Government one degree of freedom which we
assume, plausibly, that it uses to control the monetary 
impact of external events by neutralising a constant proportion 
of any variation in domestic holdings of overseas assets. 
Specifically we assume that, through Government action, a 
fixed propOrtionOof any variation from equilibrium of the value
/of
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of the national portfolio of overseas assets will be held as bonds 
(which of course count as part of wealth). So putting
= ec(. Avk)
c) dual rates
In conformity with the way this kind of system has 
normally been run (which is intended to give price stability 
to traders while not attempting to establish a fixed financial 
exchange rate in the face of the powerful force of external 
capital movements) the Government fixes the commercial rate 
Ct - o but allows to float. Again this leaves the
Government free to impose one other constraint. Again we 
assume the Government chooses to impose a fixed intervention 
rate (as introduced in Lanyi (1975)) which is the proportion 
of any surplus (or deficit) on the commercial market which 
the Government uses for purchases (or sales) of foreign bonds 
which are then added to (or subtracted from) the pool available 
to financial market. So again = bc;.
à Ï Cj “ 4^
Thus 6 c. o in Lanyi ' s terminology, is a policy of 
■QQQ-intervention and \ is a policy of neutral intervention
•under which all of any imbalance on the commercial market is 
transferred to the financial market. It is worth recalling 
again Lanyi's observation that the overall foreign account is 
only in balance ■under a policy of neutral intervention and his 
conclusion that such a policy therefore offers the only 
sustainable way of running a dual market regime. We will 
return to this below.
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îZ Solution of the model under fixed rates
We assume here, and for the next three sections, 
t *
that pt and are white noise processes about p*" ^  o 
and  ^- o • Thus we need only solve our model for ^ the 
initial impact on, and subsequent time path of ^ the economy 
following a random single period fluctuation from zero in p* 
and - the complete solution then being the sum of those 
individual solutions over all past time. '
So we have - o V ^ ^ °
so for  ^^ °  (from equations (1) and (2))
so for ?t (from (5))
where, equating (5) and (4), for ft
substituting back into (4) we get
ft
So, recalling our model is stable provided that
small enough which (as promised above) we assume.
) can also solve the model for period zero to find at tv o j
and of course r = r*
Since exchange rates are fixed it is rather easy to 
see what is going on here. An unexpected one period, e.g. rise, 
in overseas prices leads (in period zero) to an incipient rise 
in demand for domestic production (both through increased
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exports and a fall in imports). This leads to a rise in domestic 
prices which is nevertheless not enough entirely to offset the 
improvement in the terms of trade. In order to meet the 
increased domestic money demand there is also a shift in the 
portfolio of overseas assets held from bonds to money, and 
there is some accumulation of overseas assets due to the 
improved terms of trade.Then in subsequent periods the terms 
of trade have turned negative (since p\ o again) and there 
is extra domestic spending generated by the wealth effect, 
so the extra assets accumulated gradually run down as the 
domestic prices gradually slide back to their equilibrium 
level.
A similar process is initiated by an unexpected rise in 
r* (which through infinite capital mobility leads to an instant 
and equal rise in r) except that now it brings about a fall in 
domestic consumption (via a fall in investment) and a fall in 
domestic money demand — and hence a fall in domestic nrices.
The resulting inflow of overseas assets and greater demand 
on domestic production as a result of the positive terms of 
trade cause domestic prices to rise to aoove equilibrium and 
then to slide gradually back to equilibrium as described above.
Finally for this section we note that if we add an 
exogenous variation in domestic money supply, to the
left hand side of equation 5» and solve for the initial impact 
of this we rediscover the result of Mundell, po-^o-o cw) M*, c 
there is an offsetting outflow oi holdings of overseas money.
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)
1 Solution of the model under unified floating ratem
We put - 4  and recall that we have defined
cyz. and imposed - C%-
and .
Now if there is a one period shock to f  and r** at t = o 
then for V'svt the economy will follow its expected course, 
and in particular y*- = o So for  ^:>(
i = - “V«e -'"■t (from (5))
and ■= (fpom (j) and (4))
combining these we find;
We now use these formulae to substitute for c*. and fe 
back into equation (4-). In order to tidy things up put
dfPi+%) ^  Pi = <L y o
Then we find
- tO + <'o0)a - (s,* i-
now we have from equation(2) for t => I
3 Ls^ fo') ( Ct4, -
and we recall that a quadratic equation ax^ + bx + c with 
a > o ,  b < o, c > o  has just one root with modulus less than
one if and only if a + b + c < o. Now substituting for r^
in the above equation to get
+ >^ ev+, + = o
it is easy to check that A > 0, B < 0, C > 0
 ^0 -^ ')C'^ oe((îi+r,)'i,v.l
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Hence on the continuing assumption that is small enough 
not to Cause us trouble (in this case r^ < 'i?. \
we find that our system has one stablelnd ^Itstable root,
so that by the standard theory of rational expectations models 
It finds and follows its unique stable path.
, Armed with this assurance, and denoting the stable
eigenvalue by A, , we can now explicitly derive the solution 
of our model as follows;
a), solve for period o. Since at this period all expectations
zero, and c^= o, this boils down to an exercise in solving 
linear equations.
Putting
K = 4T,) 4 }A ti)] 4- CWfA) [^4 Ï, +
and noting that since ot = o ( C  ) c<.> ^  so
thus we have at period o;
- ^ ^ K
e = - Y. 4^  ^ »
It is worth commenting that all of the coefficients in
these expressions are unambiguous in sign (the only questionable
case, the r coefficient in the expression for r, being handled
by our assumption that « is reasonably large - in particular 
oc > 0^<o) Cl + ^ v^\
so the coefficient is always
Positive).
From these it is possible to derive expressions for the
terms of trade and accumulation of overseas assets in the first 
period (from equation 4-);
p* + e - P = *
~ T '   — f*
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K
+ (-'+M)[(*('')kff.)p,.(,"] - ( 1 + ^ +6+/^ Vi-l)7,f2 r
K
From these expressions it is clear that (eg) a rise in 
overseas prices brings about an unambiguous initial improvement 
in the terms of trade and an inflow of overseas assets except 
in the very special case where the expansion of domestic income 
sucks in more than enough imports to offset the improved terms 
of trade (ie relatively large). The initial effect of a 
rise in r* is more equivocal. Through capital mobility this 
will place upward pressure on domestic interest rates and hence, 
in order to balance the demand for money, on domestic prices.
So the terms of trade seem set to deteriorate. But the rise 
in domestic interest rates also causes a fall in domestic 
demand through a fall in investment. This can only be offset 
by increased exports via a more competitive exchange rate.
And this pulls the terms of trade the other way. The net 
offset depends on the precise value of the parameters in our 
model. The terms of trade will tend to improve if the fall in 
investment effect dominates ( jfg relatively large) and to 
deteriorate if the monetary balance effect dominates ( * 
relatively large). The question of whether there is a rise 
or a fall in overseas assets will similarly deoend on precise 
parameter values.
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b) for periods t>o by assumption and r* revert to zero
and the general theory of rational expectations models assures 
us that expectations will be such that the economy will place 
itself on a path which converges, with speed K back to its 
original equilibrium. In particular we have already calculated 
the accumulation/decumulation of overseas assets resulting 
from the original disturbance. It must now be the case for 
t that
) but for equations (3) and (4) 
so _ C
and from equation 2, recalling that on the surprise free path 
all expectations are met
and, as for  ^we must have e
and from equation 4
ft- -CM,]
SO " 0+^oG-^i) C ?% + c,
the signs of these various expressions will depend on the 
parameters. This is not so for the terms of trade which, again 
from equation 4, we can determine to be;
i.e. if c,>0 (so the initial disturbance has lead to an 
accumulation of assets) then the terms of trade are unambiguously 
negative - as we would expect since the path back to equilibrium
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entails a running down of holdings of overseas assets' 
i.e. a trade deficit.
We can get a slightly clearer insight into the dynamics 
of this system, and in particular the role played by the 
intervention rate by looking at our results diagramatically. 
Along the perfect foresight return to equilibrium we can 
eliminatep and y from the equations of our model to find;
B) t [c++, -Cf]
Equation A gives the locus along which ev««n^ and -o .
Equation B gives the locus along which .
we have the following phase diagram;
the c. o locus has positive slope and
,c> .q
t €+41 C î-€- <V ^ °)
•>
— >
A '
Above and to the left of AA the level of holdings of 
foreign assets is relatively high, and is largely held as money. 
Hence domestic interest rates are low and (to equalise domestic 
and international returns on capital) the exchange rate is 
appreciating. So av ' > and our economy moves leftwards. 
Similarly below and to the right of AA and our
economy moves rightward. 'Turning our attention to BB, above 
and to the left of it the level of holdings of foreign assets 
is high. This raises domestic spending and so imports so 
\ and our economy moves down. Below and to the
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right of BB and it moves up. It is easy to check
that (provided r© is small enough) AA is steeper than BB and 
that as 6 increases both become steeper. The perfect foresight 
stable trajectory must be a line something like GO along which 
accumulated overseas assets and the exchange rate both gradually 
slide bgck to their equilibrium state. It is worth commenting 
that for the values of ^  to which this diagram corresponds 
starting from a point like D the exchange rate gradually appreciates 
as holdings of overseas assets diminish — although throughout the 
process, as noted above, the terms of trade remain negative.
î^ or higher levels of intervention, i.e. when 6 >  » - ^  - v
(or of course for all e f )
the slope of the o locus becomes negative and our diagram 
becomes ;
our stable trajectory is now C—u so that starting from a point 
like D the exchange rate depreciates as holdings of overseas 
assets diminish. The reason for this change is that at high 
levels of intervention the accumulation of overseas assets is 
held largely as bonds; its impact on current spending through 
the wealth effect (tending to raise domestic interest rates 
^i^i^ishing the funds available for investment) therefore 
outweighs its contribution to the money supply (which tends to 
cut domestic interest rates). But if domestic interest rates 
are above equilibrium (and so falling) perfect capital mobility will
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equalise domestic and overseas returns by bidding up the exchange 
rate, and allowing it to depreciate. (If
then the wealth effect is so powerful that it outweighs the 
monetary expansion even with a policy of non-intervention.)
finally for this section we note two other points;
a) effect of the level of intervention on the rate of return 
to equilibrium. ‘
If we denote the unstable root of our system quadratic (p.46)
by then inspection, of the equations coefficients shows,
recalling our assumption that f© is small enough not to get in the
way (in particular ), that as 8 increases X.+X,.
increases and c-X,) (which is ) increases.
A ^
So, recalling that Xi>»>Xi>o  ^ as 6 increases 
decreases, so either increases or both A, and decrease.
But the latter possibility is contradicted by the fact that 
is increasing. So as & increases A, increases, 
i.e. as the rate of intervention increases the rate of return to 
equilibrium gets slower. This result sits well with common sense 
since one of the forces tending to restore equilibrium after 
e.g. an accumulation of overseas assets is the monetary effect 
of these assets pushing up domestic prices and so accelerating 
the outflow. If a high proportion of the accumulation of 
assets are demonetised ( 6 high) then this effect is weakened.
b) The effect of domestic monetary disturbance.
We may include in our model exogenous white noise variations 
in domestic credit. Equation 5 then becomes
-  53 -
where assumed small, is the log exogenous shift in domestic 
credit at period t. We can solve for the impact of this as 
above, assuming a single period disturbance at period 0. We 
find at period 
- . Pi + Tr. + .
P   —-----  6^ positive
® ^ positive
r =
K
- C 0*6 negative
terms of trade:
e-p = o>o almost certainly negative
~ ~~  ^i +To)((4-gX almost certainly negative
K
we will refer back to these results below.
VI Solution of the model under dual rates
In this case we put -o and (to save on superscripts)
f
write €fc = €(. As before we also impose 
and (iitrt -
Again, following a one period shock at period zero in 
and r then for the economy will follow its expected
course, so in particular = o Hence for t^i from equation (5)
cj,0-©)Ct - pt- = - ocr^
so ftiat combining (3) and (4-) to eliminate and substituting
for pt fi’om the above;
q. + St/3,
Whereas substituting for ft from equation (5) in equation (4)
we now substitute into this, from the preceding equation, 
tting rid of  ^ to get;
- Ear^ . +
r-
—  34  —
where, as before.
a = 4" (^s >o
and E = i f f© 8 - (^ -8) >o
D = C (Si ^ "* S7
so substituting from (2)
-s. 0  + t*© ) t 4 3
we find
- [a+^« + (xE -»-oiYiîilet4, 4- [<<S 4-  ^ <6-0
*" l + <0 "* '4- f© “*
which is the stability equation for our system. Clearly the 
coefficient in is positive. That in is negative
because A>oc(%2^  (since TR<i) - and is the negative
component of « It is slightly more complicated to
demonstrate, but nevertheless true, that the coefficient in 
is positive. The first point to note is that the coefficient of 6
in the expression when expanded is positive - so the expression
is minimal when ©» o But then it becomes
which is positive for the same reason as above.
Thus we can apply the same test for the existence of a
unique stable root as we did for unified floating rates. The 
sum of the coefficients in the stability equation is
Ce  ->) hg'1-%-ro
so for our system to have a stable rational expectations solution 
we require
€ < \ 
i.e. 6 < I h
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Which, while it does not look like a particularly restrictive 
condition in the level of intervention 6 nevertheless gives 
us the important result that in a Belgian system of dual exchange 
rates too high a level of intervention, and in particular a policy 
of neutral intervention is destabilising. This result (while 
in flat disagreement with that of Decaluwe and Steinherr (1976b), 
referred to in Chapter I) is in accord with economic intuition.
A major equilibrating mechanism in this model, in response to 
e.g. a rise in overseas assets is the rise in money supply 
leading to a rise in domestic prices, a deterioration in the 
terms of trade and so a faster outflow of these assets. A high 
level of intervention damps this mechanism by breaking the link 
between accumulation of overseas assets and a rise in the 
money supply.
We can now solve our model explicitly in the same two 
stages as we used for unified rates;
a) solve for period o. Again all expectations are zero 
and c© = o. So putting
we find at period o;
■p - d» + tliiw*
L. L
0 = - P* 4- ottt
L L
from which we can calculate the initial impact on the terms of 
trade (which do not of course involve the financial exchange rate)
u ■ - r “ "L"
and the initial accumulation of overseas assets;
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These expressions show that the impact of an unexpected 
(e.g.) tise in I? in a dual rate regime is very similar to its 
impact under a fixed exchange rate. The increased demand for 
domestic output leads to a rise in domestic prices which is 
nevertheless not enough entirely to offset the improvement in 
the terms of trade. The trade exchange rate by assumption is 
fixed. So there is an accumulation of overseas assets (unless 
Yi is so large that the imports sucked in by increased income 
outweigh the effect of the improved terms of trade). There is, 
however, one mechanism which operates in this case but not in 
the case of fixed rates. The increased demand for domestic 
output also leads to a rise in domestic interest rates which 
(by diminishing domestic investment) means that domestic prices 
rise less than in the fixed rates case. The differential which 
thus emerges between domestic and overseas interest rates is 
accommodated by an upvaluation of the financial exchange rate 
(in the expectation that it will then decline back to equilibrium) 
A rise in overseas interest rates has a very different, 
effect from what happens in the case of unified rates. The 
incipient differential between domestic and overseas interest 
rates leads to a bidding up in the price of overseas bonds, 
and so a rise in the financial exchange rate. Through the 
wealth effect there is then a rise in domestic spending with 
consequential rises in domestic prices, imports and (to 
maintain monetary balance) domestic interest rates, unlike 
the unified floating rate case there is no possibility of a 
fall in the commercial exchange rate to offset the deterioration 
in the terms of trade, so there is an unambiguous outflow of 
overseas assets.
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It is worth noting that this conclusion, that a dual
exchange rate system does not entirely isolate the domestic
economy from variations in the overseas interest race, is at
variance with that of earlier authors,inotably Cumby (1984;.
This difference stems entirely from the different assumption
made by Cumby about the nature of overseas bonds - that they
pay a fixed rate of interest rather t h ^  the current rate.
On that assumption the fall in face value of overseas bonds
which results from a rise in overseas interest rates precisely
cancels out the apparent increase in wealth from a rise in the
financial rate. So the net effect on domestic spending, prices, 
income etc. is nil.
for periods tvo again f and r are assumed to revert 
to zero, so again rational expectations will place the economy 
on its .inique path which converges back to equilibrium, say 
with speed \ - the single convergent root of the characteristic
equation of the system derived above. So for t
SO from 4) Pt - >0
and from 5) ^
whence from 2) r - ( it-rpB-
_ Ci-X', ) C
-o our system slides back to equilibrium in exactly the 
same way as (though in general at a different rate to) what it 
would do under unified floating rates. Indeed it is noteworthy 
that the formal expression for the terms of trade at period t 
is the same under floating and dual rates (although c, will 
differ in the two cases). Both are negative if there has been
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an initial accumulation of overseas assets - and so in both 
cases these excess assets are gradually disbursed on the path 
back to equilibrium.
As in the case of unified floating rates we can put our 
results in the form of a phase diagram. Elimination of p and y 
from the equations of our model now gives us along the perfect 
foresight return to equilibrium;
A) [ f
Now for low values of ©Ci.e. »-
provided of course Si < ) we find the phase diagram;
/c
T r
the stable locus is a line like cc and starting from a point 
like D the financial exchange rate appreciates as holdings of 
overseas assets diminish (as originally established by Elood (1977)) 
As 9 increases the slope of AA and BB become steeper 
(i.e. the gradient of BB becomes increasingly negative). At
6 Ci \ — the curve AA crosses the o axis and our
diagram becomes;
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8o that at high levels of intervention, starting from 
a point D, and exactly as in the case of floating rates, the 
financial rate depreciates as surplus overseas assets are disbursed, 
As 9 continues to grow larger the BB locus continues to
I
swing clockwise and the AA locus to swing anti-clockwise until, 
when G - they coincide. 'This, happily, is the point
at which the algebra tells us that a unique rational expectations 
solution ceases to exist.
As in the case of unified rates . is easy to check that as # 
increases so do A, and (where is the
unstable root of the characteristic equation ) whence, arguing 
exactly as in the case of unified floating rates, as the rate
/
of intervention 8 rises so the rate of return to equilibrium 
gets slower.
Finally for this section we may, as we did for unified 
rates, calculate the impact of small white noise variations in 
domestic credit. Equation 5 becomes
+je
Where is the log exogenous shift in domestic credit 
in period t . We again assume a single period disturbance at 
period o, and find for t =■ o >
p =  ^do positive, so terms of trade are negative
e = *■ positive
L
^ negative
Cyj= negative
U
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VII _Comparison of Different Exchange Rate Regimes
We now compare fixed, floating and dual exchange rate 
regimes from the point of view of their ability to insulate 
the domestic economy from the impact of exogenous (and therefore 
uncontrollable) disturbances. We use as our measure of the 
®HIcacity of each regime in this respect the impact on domestic 
income y of external disturbances. By the Lucas—Sargent equation 
this amounts to viewing as most desirable that exchange rate 
regime which minimises the divergence under external disturbance 
of the domestic price level from its previously expected 
level CPe) - which is the same criterion as that used
in Flood (1979).
Since dual rates are fixed for trade transactions and 
float for financial transactions one might naively expect an 
economy run under them to behave like an economy run under fixed 
rates in response to variations in the overseas price level, 
and like an economy run under floating rates in response to 
variations in the overseas interest rate. Indeed in a static 
analysis this must be true. But it turns out that the 
introduction of rational expectations dynamics yields an 
interestingly different result.
A casual glance at the rather complicated expressions 
derived above suggests that any comparison between the 
effectiveness of the three exchange rate regimes will be very 
dependent on the various parameter values of the economy.
As a matter of mathematics this is true, but for economic 
purposes we are only interested in making the comparison under 
plausible parameter values, and to do this it is enough to 
recall our observations above that Q  is likely to be relatively
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small, and that k and (ij will be CCC) vAile the various
other parameters appearing in the equations will in general be
0(1). In order to make this idea analytically useful we will
say chat expressions A and 3 are of the same order of magnitude
xf «/q'-o6), a is of a lower order of magnitude than B if
and we will write if A-B is of a lower
order of magnitude than A (this is clearly an equivalence
relation). In particular it is easy to see in the expressions 
above that K ^  L .
Thus we can calculate the effect on domestic prices (and 
so on domestic income) of a given small unanticipated shift in 
overseas prices under the various exchange rate regimes. Using 
the results above we find;
impact under floating rates 
impact under dual rates
impact under fixed rates ^   ^^  0 +^) (33
impact under dual rates
Thus we find that, contrary to what naively might seem
likely to be the case, dual rates and floating rates are of
equal effect (to within 0(r^)) in insulating domestic income
from variations in the overseas price level, and both are more
effective (to an extent dependent on precise parameter values), 
than fixed rates.
The reasons for this are not far to seek. Both dual 
and floating rates permit some rise in domestic interest rates 
(balanced by a shift in exchange rate expectations) to partially 
offset the increased demand for domestic production brought about
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by an overseas price rise. Under floating rates there is also 
upvaluation in the trade exchange rate but this is small (indeed 
an order of magnitude small) by comparison. So to within an 
order of magnitude dual and floating rates have the same effect. 
ISider fixed rates by contrast there can be no offsetting movement 
in domestic interest rates - so the impact on domestic prices 
must be that much sharper.
We now turn to the effect on domestic prices of an ’ 
unanticipated small rise in overseas interest rates. Here we find; 
effect under floating rates ^ 
effect under dual rates 
and (without writing out the complicated expressions embodying 
the result) the effect under floating rates and under dual rates 
is an order of magnitude smaller than the effect under fixed rates.
Looking at the dual rate/floating rate comparison first, 
it is easy to check (recalling that
and our assumption (p4?) that <o < ) that the expression
above is greater than one, and probably quite considerably so 
depending upon precise parameter values. Thus dual rates do 
achieve their intended purpose of more effectively insulating 
the domestic economy from exogenous capital flows (represented 
in this model by shifts in r*). And the way they do it is 
the obvious one. 3y decoupling changes in the terms of trade 
from changes in the financial exchange rate brought about by 
shifts in overseas interest rates they diminish the impact of 
such shifts on domestic prices.
The vastly greater effectiveness of both dual and floating 
rates by comparison with fixed rates in insulating domestic
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income from changes in the overseas interest rate is also 
worthy of note. It turns out that in the case of dual rates 
the adjustment of exchange rate expectations to a large extent
absorbs the shock of any change in r %  and^so diminishes the
impact on domestic prices (and income). For floating rates 
the same effect works (less) but is supplemented by the shift 
in the terms of trade which further diminishes the impact on 
domestic prices. Under fixed rates this exchange rate shock 
absorber is absent, so the impact on domestic prices is greater 
by an order of magnitude.
We may also look at the impact of exogenous shifts in 
domestic money supply. As noted above (p45), and as Mundell 
has famously pointed out, under fixed rates this will have 
no effect. So the only calculation we need to make is;
effect under floating rates ^ (i-i + 'ÿ, +
effect under dual rates 
same reasoning as was used above this expression is 
greater than one, so dual rates are (to some extent) more 
effective than floating rates in protecting the domestic economy 
from this sort of shock too.
-finally xor this section we look at the question of the 
speed of return to equilibrium after an exogenous shock. We 
confine our comparison to dual rates and floating rates. We 
will make heavy use of the following (easily proved) lemma;
if and + = v, + then > v.v,
if and only if v, > u,.
We have, from the stability equation under unified floating 
rates (page 4^ that if X, is the stable root of that equation 
Xj its unstable root and ju., = (so [*, > o > )•
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c — 4 tTo9 ((?4+T0
U  + fw)<^  (,4-^ .)^
a simple computation shows that
-  f-f.e + _  ,  ( ^ i V î î -
iff (and' it is easy to check )
\ so by our lemma
iff ev-6H< _ h
^ (2t4V,
similarly, and with similar notation, for dual rates we have
(a[ + - Yt (^ got + 0 - 9 ) S%p, ^e
a 0+^ )14
and
L>+'<’oY ^  A
now
Yt
whence by our lemma
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It follows that the relationship between the speeds of 
return to equilibrium under dual and floating rates depends on 
the rate of intervention,and the proportion,of foreign 
reserves to total domestic money supply. If the expression 
is high (specifically then the rate of
return is faster under dual than under unified floating rates.
If is low then the reverse is true.
The' reason for this is not difficult to see. Reverting 
to our phase diagrams (page "5^ ) we note that the condition
is precisely the condition for the e,. t et+, 
locus to have positive slope. It means that the effect of an 
exogenously brought about accumulation of overseas assets on the 
money supply outweighs its effect on prices so that domestic 
interest rates fall, and hence the financial exchange rate 
must devalue in expectation of a subsequent appreciation.
In the case of unified floating rates this devaluation will 
necessarily slow the outflow of overseas assets, and hence the 
return to equilibrium whereas under dual rates (where the 
commercial exchange rate cannot change) this effect cannot 
operate.
VIII Dual Rates with no established equilibrium
Hitherto, by making pj. and white noise processes
about T* - r * ^  o we have in eff ect centred . our system on a 
given equilibrium position (or on a given predictabletrend path 
which has been abstracted out of our small case variables).
It is conceivable that this may have unfairly tilted the 
comparisons made above in favour of those exchange rate 
systems which contain a fixed component. For where there is
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a known equilibrium there is an obvious point at which to set 
a fixed exchange rate. The problem with moving from mathematics 
to the real world (or at least one of them) is that the optimal 
point at which to set your exchange rate becomes less than 
obvious, and the price you pay for getting it wrong may be 
greater than just letting it float.
So in this section we extend our comparison of dual and 
floating rates to the case where and r" follow an ARIFiA 
f o , p r o c e s s  i.e abandoning our earlier use of 
case variables, we assume;
* fit 4
where (Rt - ^
and llTt and are (small) white noise processes.
Similarly, we assume;
pV. ?e4
where iz)
Pt = 4 «le
and 4^^  ) are again white noise processes.
Thus the unobservable variables and Pt follow random
walks while the observable variables r* and f* fluctuate
around them in a random manner. Such processes are examined
e.g. in Chow (1975) whose key result for our present purpose
IS that if Kt is the best estimate of when is known (so 
n ^
that (<t- is a white noise variable) then;
where
M < )
similarly;
?(. = +C'-A) Pt ^  ^ with A simimixariv
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■ ith and P following these processes how should a
dual exchange rate system be managed? With a fixed intervention 
rate G we have five equations in six unknowns pt. 4. )
Hitherto we have slid round this difficulty by setting 4  = »
Hut under the new regime that is no longer obviously efficient.
How should the commercial rate be fixed in those circumstances 
In answering this question we first note a principle 
which we have implicitly observed in the earlier parts of this 
chapter: in equilibrium ' b  %is is arbitrary in
that It is not imposed by our equations. But it is also 
sensible; in the real world any enduring differential between 
the two rates is likely to result in widespread evasion of 
the regulations on which the dual rate system depends (as the 
Belgian experience shows cf Decaluwe and Steinherr (1976)).
Thus we retain this principle and set at that value at 
which, in equilibrium, we would expect ej = (%is is
not of course the only rule we could adopt. A possible 
alternative for an Italian, but not Belgian, dual rate system 
would be to choose that value for 4  which would set 
at some fixed value r' _ presumed optimal for. say, growth.
The rule adopted here does, however, have the virtue of 
allowing direct comparison between dual rates and unified 
exchange rate systems. If dual rates come well out of such 
a comparison then we know that the authorities can gain by 
establishing a dual rate system using this rule for setting 4  
and might do even better using other rules).
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In symbols, if we denote by the equilibrium value 
of the variable x when r *c , p*- ^hen
4  - )
I
With this rule we now proceed to solve our system under
dual rates. For any variable x. we write
•sct- % xt + ^"1  ^ say
so that act is the equilibrium value of when r*-
say and Pt Our aim, then, is to split our
system of equations into two systems, one in the and one 
in the .
Equation 1: splits straightforwardly. Clearly for all t so
(O îjt - o all tjand since (Pt-) we also have
C\') y t = ( pe - EtH ( Pt ))
Equation 2: is the complicated one. The key point to note
is that from the nature of the processes behind and
 ^ - ?V-i ( ^
and T Eni (Pl-)
so Ft.., = E^, («h = «f
(2) hence ru * r».*
and
(2' ) Ew, ( J
Equation 3: In equilibrium, with r\ r,.'*' ^ p*^  pj  ^4  *
the right hand side vanishes identically to give equation 3 in
the oc. This then leaves ;
Cf4|-C|. -s: RMb of equation 3 with substituted 
for throughout, and 4 = 0
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Equation 4: The same happens as with equation 3. The right hand 
side, with substituted for throughout, vanishes identically
A
to give equation (4) - and leaves
4') - Ce) - RHS of equation 4 with for
throughout and - 0 
Equation 3 splits in the obvious way. The x-t must satisfy
3) %  ) - Pfe = - 0^4 + jr
and this leaves 
5') 4  _ % -arj, i
We can now dispose of the . The five equations ^ to 5
are simple linear equations in five variables ( )
depending on two known parameters, (Ch) - &nd
They may be solved at each period t and constitute, in a sense, 
the 'equilibrium' component of the overall solution (i.e. what 
the solution would be if the system were in equilibrium).
It should be noted that since c. o movement in this part 
of the solution does not affect domestic production.
We now split the part of the solution further. Write
where the oc'J! are solutions of equations 1) to 5) (i.e. our 
original 5 equations) with f^  = o , 4  “ 4  p* . 4  )
It
and the are solutions of the equations;
^") ( Pt '  (pb))
2") ]
3”) V^+4 — D — Pb
4") fo6] 4  = ' ï»Plr " Yi - Ft
5”) 0'“^ ) Pe ' -
where the driving function in these equations, is
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It is then clear that Xf + aC|. does constitute a 
solution, and so the solution, to the 'equations; 1' to 5'.
■ II
*^e look first at the As noted above these satisfy
equations 1) - 5) with = o and rj. and substituted for 
r* and p* . Moreover r*_ 1^, (r*) and ft' - Pt " E^, (P')
are clearly white noise processes (in fact it is easy to check
that <t ■= It ^  ^  ), Hence the 4" part of the
solution is identical to the solution in the white noise case
with zero equilibrium described in section VI above. This is 
the part of the overall solution which results from unpredicted 
changes in the exogenous parameters. In particular the initial 
impact of unpredicted changes in and »’*are reflected in 
variations in p (and so j ) according to the formula® on p.55 
above.
Finally we look at the component of the solution.
It is worth noting that the driving function, is again a 
white noise process. In fact it is straightforwardto establish
A A
from equations (3) and (4) (using the facts that ^ r/
and ^ t - o ) ;
  ft + 4,
and  ^ a.tVi6U ? 3l.6 WS.-ro6- *
Ph. - b* = Pt -  Pt = Ap^_ +0 -A)p*t -
' 0 A )( pt - Pf )
- (l-A') Pt
similarly
so
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Now since the homogeneous form of the equations in the 
is the same as that for the x'" (and that in Section VI above)
it follows that after the initial impact of a shift in the
value of thp driving function the solution will converge back 
to zero in the same way, and at the same rate, as in Section VI 
above. All that remains to be done therefore to complete the 
solution for the x. is to compute the initial impact of Ff 
taking a non-zero value at period t. But casual inspection 
of the equations under this hypothesis shows that the initial 
solution must be;
’• f-
c
Cy s.
In particular the part of the solution, which might
be described as that component which results from modifying 
expectations as to the likely future course of and p 
does not affect domestic income. Ihe reaction to such a change 
of expectations is simply to adjust holdings of overseas assets 
to reflect the new expected equilibrium level.
'Zhis completes the solution for dual rates. It is easy 
to see that exactly the same analysis will go through for 
unified floating rates (except that now, of course, we need to 
make no assumption as to how is set). Again \ie can split
A I» *\
the solution into three parts ; ^
and again;
V A
the will move as the expected equilibrium if the system 
moves, and will have no effect on domestic income, 
b; the Xf will shift in response to changing expectations as 
tc ohe future course of and p (i.e. in response to a white
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noise process), buch shifts will initially be reflected in 
adjustments to holdings of overseas assets and will then dissipate 
as the tend back to zero at the same rate as in the fixed 
equilibrium case. Again domestic income will not be affected, 
c) the ■ yiy reflect the reaction of the system to and pt 
i.e. the unpredicted movements in rf and p*. The impact of 
such movements is of precisely the same magnitude and form as 
in the fixed equilibrium case.
It follows that a dual rate system is more effective than 
a unified floating rate system at protecting domestic income 
from exogenous disturbances even when and r* follow the 
processes described above -provided is set as suggested above.
The extension of this analysis to fixed exchange rates 
may merit a footnote. Again we need to decide on a strategy 
for fixing the exchange rate errand again our system is under­
specified in that, in equilibrium, we have 5 equations in 6 
unknowns ( ^  , t , F»” i ^ means of dealing with
this compatible with the analysis above is as follows; 
a) the Government fixes the mix of overseas assets it wishes 
the economy to hold in equilibrium (recall that with fixed rates 
it cannot fix an intervention rate in general) i.e. it fixes an 
intervention rate ^ with
A ^
and ? Bcf
Mç c 0-6)
Having thus reduced the number of variables by one the equations 
unambiguously set a rate for €j. which is the rate it would 
take if allowed to float with r* ^  and T:  ^ fix c at
this rate for period t. (This is in fact the way the fixed rate
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was, implicitly, chosen in the fixed equilibrium version of
the model - except that there the result proved to be independent 
of 0 ).
With these assumptions the model solves in exactly the 
same way as before - yielding a solution of the form S i-oc'V 
with^the * reflecting the shifting equilibrium, the «" driven by
and the ^ driven by f' and and both of the latter 
solving exactly as in the fixed equilibrium case.
Conclusion
It may be worth briefly recapitulating our results. We
have constructed a simple linear model of an open economy producing
a differentiated product in which exchange rates are set by capital
movements and balance on the current account is achieved o v e r  t i m e
hy the effects of asset movements. We have shown that for such an
economy a dual exchange rate system can be expected to be considerably
more effective than either fixed or floating rates in insulating
domestic economic activity from the effects of external capital
movements although even with dual rates the insulation is not total.
This is not surprising: it is what the dual exchange rate system was
invented for. More interestingly, however, a dual system performs
as well as floating rates in insulating domestic production from
overseas price rises (where both perform considerably better than fixed
rates) and better in insulating it from exogenous variations in 
domestic money supply.
Moreover these conclusions do not only hold in the easy case when 
there is an obvious, and fixed, equilibrium value at which to set the 
commercial exchange rate. Even when our domestic economy lives in a 
world whose key variables perform a random walk on which we have
/imperfect
7 4  -
imperfect information we are best protected by a dual rate system 
provided tbat we adjust the commercial exchange rate sensibly to 
external conditions - e.g. (as in our model) by setting it to the 
"^3due we would expect a unified rate to take in equilibrium.
Our model has also cast some light on the effects of Government 
intervention between the two foreign exchange markets. For low levels 
of intervention the speed of return to equilibrium after a disturbance 
is faster in a dual market than under a unified floating rate, and 
under both systems the exchange rate appreciates as holdings of 
overseas assets diminish. As the rate of intervention rises the 
speeds of return diminish, but at differing rates. At a crossover 
point ( ^  the speed of return under unified floating
rates becomes faster than under dual rates, although both continue to 
decrease as d increases. And the exchange rate now depreciates as 
holdings of overseas assets diminish. Finally, as ^ approaches 1 
(a policy of neutral intervention), our model under a Belgian system 
of dual rates ceases to yield a unique rational expectations 
solution, suggesting that hitherto unconsidered factors become more 
prominent in deciding the course of the economy. But under an 
Ttalian system our model continues to yield a unique solution up to 
and including under a policy of neutral intervention.
It may also be worth drawing attention to a couple of possible 
refinements to our model which might merit further work. The first 
would be to incorporate some allowance for the 'leakage' between 
financial and commercial markets which can be expected to take place 
(and in fact does) whenever a substantial gap opens up between the 
two rates. This modification would plainly dilute the advantages 
of the dual rate system as they emerge from our model. The second 
would be to make our rather rudimentary supply function (equation 1)
/more
75
more realistic by including in it a term for the effect of the past 
e.g. by modifying it to
f^cpt - ikK,
Such a change would yield considerable analytical complications
(landing us with a cubic characteristic equation - and hence'little
prospect of a solution as detailed as that for our present mddel)
and It is not clear what effect it would have on the dual rate/floating
rate comparison. But the results we already have (p65) on the speed
of return to equilibrium under dual and floating rates is suggestive.
If this pattern were maintained then for higher (and, under certain
parameter values, all) intervention rates the speed of return of T
to its equilibrium level would be faster under floating rates than
under dual rates, whereas at low levels of intervention the reverse
would be true. The consequence for the attractiveness of dual rates
lor any pabticular economy is likely to depend upon precise parameter 
values.
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Appendix I: Derivation of the Model
We consider small variations of the domestic and world 
economy about some equilibrium (or, which makes no difference, 
some predictable trend growth). At the equilibrium domestic 
interest rates will be equal to overseas interest rates and 
the exchange rate(s) will be equal to each other and, by 
choice of units, will take the value 1. As a matter of notation 
if (upper case) X is any scalar variable then X is its 
®Q.u.ilibrium value and we define (lower case) x by
X - Xo(
so, for small variations about X^; x ^  'og
We make one exception to this rule, writing for interest rates
R = fo+r
where r^, the equilibrium interest rate is assumed small enough 
not to disequilibrate the model but larger than the small 
variations from equilibrium r. We now derive the equestions 
of our model as follows;
Equation 1 : production
we use the standard hueas-Sargent equation 
'jt - r ( Ph - ph)
Aquation 2: interest rate party
let E be the exchange rate used for current transactions,
e the rate used for capital transactions (both as units of
domestic currency per unit of foreign currency). Let e ' denote
the rate used for interest earned on foreign bonds (so
depending on the precise rules of the system). Mow consider the
return at period t<-i of S units of domestic currency placed 
at period t.
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If this is placed domestically return is (j+- d)s
If placed overseas, at interest rate expected return is 
(in domestic currency)
'=-t
where, here and henceforth, we adopt the convention that when 
in period t economic decisions are taken, and the values of 
the various variables therefore set, the only expectations 
available to decision takers are those formed on the basis of 
the information available at the end of period t-1.
Capital is assumed infinitely mobile so these two expressions 
must be equal.
which, sorted out and using the smallness of and e' gives
, r*_ C ) + c teV,, )
Equation 3» The Domestic Goods market
We use the identity X-M =4ç+l-^ i.e. the trade surplus 
is equal to net domestic deferred consumption. We add the
following assumptions:
a) for wealth effect purposes net wealth is composed entirely 
of holdings M^,of foreign currency and of foreign bonds (i.e. 
all but a negligible proportion of real domestic capital is in 
fact domestically borrowed and so self-cancelling - this is 
net a necessary assumption but considerably simplifies the analysis)
w , e^Mt + et p*Sh 
p
h) net domestic investment is negatively proportional to domestic 
interest rates = say.
c) saving is proportional to income = ■s.Y say, but is offset
u tendency to spend from wealth ^ s^ u) say, with »,s .
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d) at equilibrium (and again abstracting out any predictable 
growth trend) net domestic saving and net domestic
investment must both be zero (otherwise we have e.g. an
indefinitely accumulating pool of domestic investment affecting 
marginal returns etc.). So in particular 3^ -
e) the trade surplus/deficit X-M will be spent on increasing/ 
decreasing holdings of foreign money from to , and bonds 
from to .
putting all this together we find (in foreign currency terms)
+ «4V -8r) C fit 6. ^ X
the term RP Sj. comes from interest on holdings 
of foreign bonds. Now, dividing through bÿ M, and putting
. h-- ' 4 ?  • P:; %
we find s^bstituting Vt - etc;
+ +p.r*+ji,r,H +(î.ripî'S»M> «r«t'+W)
-Sj.pl Pi- + Pi C p i - ^  *j^)
and for this to balance at equilibrium the term in square brackets 
must Vanish so
Pi = Si ^  Ox “
Equation 4: Demand for exports and imports
We have
change in holdings of external assets = overseas interest 
earned + receipts from exports - expenditure on imports or, in 
foreign currency terms.
«^4-4,-Mf 4(%&.4|- R*P^ g|. + ^
Where exports (X) are priced at domestic rates, while 
imports (^) are priced at overseas rates. We now assume
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a) demajid for imports depends negatively on the commercial
terms of trade ^  where
^ P
and < I
(diminishing marginal overseas demand for exports).
b) demand for imports depends negatively on the commercial 
terms of trade and positively on domestic income;
KJo ’  ^Vo ^  and < \
(diminishing marginal demand for imports).
%mbining these equations, dividing through by and noting 
that in equilibrium we must have
G) %  ^  4- %  ^ 0 — 0^ — Ô
we find
M 4 . 4 , + piTobi- 4 Pf) “ i
where  ^ V» - -%1 I
Mo Mo i
We assume the Marshall-Lerner condition: > o We also
assume that equilibrium holdings of exchange are enough to pay 
for one periods imports 
so I >
Mo Mo
so
Equation 5: The LM Curve
This is of course standard. The simplest way to get the 
form we need is to assume that domestic money supply (composed 
of holdings of foreign money plus a fixed domestic credit 
component) divided by money G.D.P. is negatively proportional 
to the domestic interest rate 
so C m j >  , _ ftd
py
whence 4-M(.) — Pi-
where
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Appendix III» Italian Type Dual Rates
The only difference to the equations of our model introduced 
by use of an Italian rather than a Belgian style dual market 
(i.e. payment of interest on overseas assets through the 
commercial rather than the financial market)is that the interest 
rate parity equation becomes;
f To )
The major difference that this makes is in the static 
analysis of the economy, for at equilibrium
r = 4- )
which allows the economy to settle at points where r*
This possibility has been extensively canvassed in the literature 
(as noted in Chapter I).
From the point of view of the present dynamic analysis of 
responses to small exogenous disturbances, however, use of an 
Italian rather than a Belgian type dual market system makes 
little difference - with one exception. Indeed since the only 
change in the addition of a term of order r^ to the interest 
rate parity equation the formulae for the initial impact of 
exogenous variations in r*, p*, and domestic money supply (page 55) 
will only be changed by some multiple of r , so that our general 
assumption about the smallness of r^ ensures that the major 
conclusions about their magnitude (relative to that of the 
comparable expressions under unified rates) will not be affected.
Where there is a significant change is in the stability 
equation (page 54). Under an Italian system this becomes:
it is possible to show as for a Belgian system that the and
■" 81 —
coefficients are positive and the «-ki coefficient negative. 
Their sum is
the e coefficient in this can easily be checked to be positive,
SO the expression is maximal when 8-1 but then it is ; '
(oiy,
So on the (plausible) assumption that (2, <. 
and on the continuing assumption that r^ is small enough not to 
get in the way (i.e. in this case  ^ .
we find that under an Italian dual market system (unlike under 
a Belgian dual market system) there a unique rational 
expectations solution under a policy of neutral intervention.
Perhaps the best way to see why this should be so is to 
look again at the phase diagram for higher levels of intervention, 
The point to note is that the different ways interest is paid 
under the two systems at any level of the financial exchange
rate cj. mean that the rate of domestic interest r^ which will
yield identical returns on money placed at home and money placed 
overseas (and so means \ will be r_* under the
Belgian system and — under the Italian system.
Thus if e.g. the interest rate, and so holdings of
overseas assets c^^will need to be higher under the Italian 
system than under the Belgian system to ensure .
Hence in the diagram;
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The A'A' locus along which under the Italian
System is steeper than the AA locus where under the
Belgian system (it is easy to check that the BB locus is the 
same under the two systems). Now as noted above as © increases 
the AA locus (and the A'A' locus) swing anti-clockwise while 
the BB locus swings clockwise. When they meet the unique 
national expectations solution disappears. But the higher 
(negative) slope of the a'A' locus ensures that under the 
Italian system this does not happen for 6 4 1 ,
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